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Why Domestic Enforcement of Private
Regulation Is (Not) the Answer: Making and
Questioning the Case of Corporate Social
Responsibility Codes
ANNA BECKERS & MARK T. KAWAKAMI

I. GLOBAL PRIVATE REGULATION AND THE DOMESTIC STATE

Globalization has been commonly understood as a phenomenon that
leads to the dissolution of territorial borders and the growing
interdependence of social and economic activities that remain spatially
remote.' The law, in this regard, has not been spared from the impacts
of globalization either. There is a constant interest in grasping the
evolving legal system under the effects of globalization in terms such as
4
3
transnational law, 2 global law without or beyond the state, global legal
6
pluralism,5 or transnational regulation. Certainly, much can be gained
from a conceptualization of global ordering structures as autonomous
global law that function independently of the state legal system.

1. See Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, Globalization and Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 413,

415 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
2. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, TransnationalLaw, Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAw 898 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012); GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER
ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL
PRIVATE LAW (2010).

3. See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997)
(discussing how global law creates a de-centered law-making process that occurs outside
the state).
4. See generally Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2007) (envisioning that law without political influence
could constitute a global law without a state).
5. See generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE

OF LAw BEYOND BORDERS (2012) (exploring an alternative jurisprudence that seeks to
create or preserve spaces for productive interaction among multiple overlapping legal
systems through the development of procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices
that aim to manage, without eliminating, the legal pluralism around us).
6. See, e.g., Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of
TransnationalPrivateRegulation, 38 J.L. & SOC'Y 1, 1 (2011).
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Nevertheless, the enthusiasm for the effective functioning of these
global ordering structures has recently waned. In particular, private
regulatory processes have experienced various instances of functional
ineffectiveness at the global level. 7 Moreover, these private regulatory
processes may face serious problems in terms of legitimacy and
accountability,8 which, in turn, provide a justification to reconsider the
role of domestic legal systems.
In this context, it is equally important to note that the state and its
formal legal system have never been irrelevant for global legal
processes. To the contrary, the functions of domestic courts and
legislators remain significant and relevant-as much as the global
processes-and should continue to be so. The true global "delocalized"
law has rightly been labeled as a utopia.9 Against this background
emerges the question of whether domestic legal systems can and should
play a role in administering and enforcing these global rules against
private actors. In other words, is a stronger regulatory role of domestic
law an appropriate response to the risks associated with the processes
of economic globalization?
In response, legal research seems to have already initiated a change
in focus from the characteristics of this transnational ordering to
investigating the interaction of global rules with state legal systems.' 0
One important element in this discussion is the renewed focus on the
7. See Paul Verbruggen, Regulatory Governance by Contract: The Rise of Regulatory
Standards in Commercial Contracts, 35 RECHT DER WERKELIJKHEID 79, 93-96 (2014).
8. See, e.g., Julia Black & David Rouch, The Development of the Global Markets as
Rule-Makers: Engagement and Legitimacy, 2 LAW & FIN. MKT. REV. 218, 223-28 (2008);
Fabrizio Cafaggi & Katharina Pistor, Regulatory Capabilities:A Normative Frameworkfor
Assessing the Distributional Effects of Regulation, 9 Reg. & Governance 95, 97 (2015);
Verbruggen, supra note 7, at 91-93.
9. See Ralf Michaels, Dreaming Law Without a State: Scholarship on Autonomous
InternationalArbitrationas Utopian Literature, 1 LONDON REV. INT'L L. 35, 39 (2013).
10. See Michael Torrance, Persuasive Authority Beyond the State: A Theoretical
Analysis of TransnationalCorporate Social Responsibility Norms as Legal Reasons Within
Positive Legal Systems, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1573 (2011); cf. Gralf-Peter Calliess & Andreas
Maurer, TransnationalesRecht-Eine Einleitung [TransnationalLaw-An Introduction],
in TRANSNATIONALES RECHT: STAND UND PERSPEKTIVEN [TRANSNATIONAL LAw: STATUS

AND PROSPECTS] (Gralf-Peter Calliess ed. 2014) (explaining the need for transnational law
research to conceptualize the relation between the law and the state); Olaf Dilling et al.,
Introduction: Private Accountability in a Globalising World, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS:
SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 1, 1-13 (Olaf

Dilling et al. eds., 2008) (reconstructing self-regulatory settings in terms of selforganization, problem-solving, and legitimation, and examining how legal concepts are
reflected in self-regulation and builds on private governance); Christopher A. Whytock,
Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV. 67, 70 (2009) (systematically
analyzing the global impact of domestic courts, which are, for better or worse, involved in
regulating transnational activity).
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enforcement of global private regulation through private law. Shifting
the attention from the less tangible social pressures to legal
enforcement, scholars have identified a variety of substantive areas in
which the legal enforcement of private regulation could play a role,"
13
12
such as advertising and food safety, labor standards, and financial
markets. 14 In that respect, it is also normatively postulated that the
national legal and political systems should play a more significant role
in order to reinforce the potential rather than undermining the
15
regulatory efforts on a global scale.
This issue aims to contribute to this debate by providing different
perspectives on whether and how domestic enforcement of transnational
private regulation through private law can and should be furthered, if
at all. This is accomplished by narrowing the broader topic and focusing
on the investigation of one particular area: the starting point of all the
contributions will be the debate over private corporate social
responsibility (CSR) codes and the case for or against their enforcement
under domestic private law. These CSR codes are understood as codes of
conduct developed and published by transnational corporations to show
their globally applicable commitment to respect human rights, improve
fundamental labor standards, protect the natural environment, and
prevent corruption.
11. See ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A
GLOBAL WORLD (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed., 2012) (detailing the variety of areas in which

enforcements questions arise).
12. See PAUL VERBRUGGEN, ENFORCING TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING AND FOOD SAFETY (2014) (detailing the practices

of enforcing transnational private regulation in the areas of adverting and food safety and
identifying circumstances in which administrative enforcement may strengthen private
enforcement mechanisms).
13. See Carola Glinksi, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Moral or Legal Obligation?, in THE
NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 119

(Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007); Eva Kocher, Codes of Conduct and Framework
Agreements on Social Minimum Standards-Private Regulation?, in RESPONSIBLE
BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 67
(Olaf Dilling et al. eds., 2008); LOUISE VYTOPIL, CONTRACTUAL CONTROL IN THE SUPPLY
CHAIN: ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODES OF CONDUCT, CONTRACTS AND
(AVOIDING) LIABILITY (2015).

14. See Hugh Collins, Flipping Wreck: Lex Mercatoriaon the Shoals of lus Cogens, in
CONTRACT GOVERNANCE: DIMENSIONS IN LAW AND INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 383

(Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2015).
15. See, e.g., Dilling, supra note 10, at 7 ("By including the informal structures within
its area of responsibility, formal law can enhance their degree of publicity, reliability and
substantial consistency and, therefore, their legitimacy."); cf. DANI RODRIK, THE
GLOBALIZATION PARADOx: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 238

(2011) ("Our only chance of strengthening the infra-structure of the global economy lies in
reinforcing the ability of democratic governments to provide those foundations.").
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The focus on private corporate social responsibility initiatives
seems, for that debate, a particularly suitable example: First, unlike in
other forms of private self-regulation, domestic enforcement is critical
for corporate social responsibility because separate enforcement
institutions have not evolved on a global level. In relation to the lex
mercatoria, arbitral tribunals are primarily called upon to provide for
juridification. For private internet governance, the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has evolved as a core
player. The Court of Arbitration (CAS) has been dominant in shaping
and enforcing the lex sportiva. Similar international courts or private
arbitral institutions, although recently considered,16 have not been
realized for corporate social responsibility rules. To the contrary, the
intense debate about foreign direct liability-exemplified by the Kiobel
case in the United States1 7 and the case pending against Shell in the
Netherlands' 8-shows that domestic courts remain prominent instances
for the enforcement of corporate social responsibility. 19 Second, global
corporate social responsibility codes are a specific form of a globalized
economic system paving the way for corporate self-limitation 20 and
simultaneous phenomena that are deeply enshrined within national
political economies and their related legal structures. 21 As a result, this
specific case cannot only be seen as a test case for the domestic
enforcement of global regulation in general but also as providing
insights into how rules developed within a global economic system can
16. See Claes Cronstedt & Robert C. Thompson, A Proposal for an International
Arbitration Tribunal on Business and Human Rights, 57 HARV. INT. L.J. 66 (2016); see
also Anna Beckers, Legalization Under the Premises of Globalization: Why and Where to
Enforce Corporate Social Responsibility Codes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 15 (2017)
(discussing tribunals as possible enforcement institutions). For further discussion on these
tribunals, see Pierre Thielborger & Tobias Ackermann, A Treaty on Enforcing Human
Rights Against Business: Closing the Loophole or Getting Stuck in a Loop?, 24 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 43 (2017).
17. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
18. See Rb. Den Haag [District Court of the Hague] 30 januari 2013,
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:BY9854 (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.).
19. See generally Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social
Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 260 (2009) (discussing the
autonomous juridification of global private regulation with a view to lex mercatoria, lex
digitalis, and corporate social responsibility and identifying domestic courts as key
elements in the juridification process regarding corporate social responsibility).
20. See Gunther Teubner & Anna Beckers, Expanding Constitutionalism, 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 523, 533-36 (2013).
21. See generally Dirk Matten & Jeremy Moon, "Implicit" and "Explicit" CSR: A
Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Understanding of Corporate Social
Responsibility, 33 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 404 (2008) (contrasting the methodologies and
institutional theories of the United States and European nations in regulating companies
by means of corporate social responsibility).
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be linked to the path-dependent and stably-institutionalized national
political economies. 22
II. DEBATING THE CASE OF DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT: WHETHER AND
WHY
Focusing on the enforcement of corporate social responsibility codes,
the contributions in this issue are concerned with two questions:
1.

Is it possible and feasible to use domestic law, in
particular private law, to enforce global corporate
social responsibility codes?

2.

Is it normatively desirable to further domestic
enforcement?

In relation to both questions, the value of this collection of
contributions is that all authors take very different theoretical
perspectives and approaches to answer these questions, thereby offering
a controversy on whether and how much we actually need the state and
its domestic legal system in an era of globalization. The contributions
23
take perspectives deriving from doctrinal legal thinking, normative
25
sociological jurisprudence, 24 comparative political economy research,
26
international human rights theory and law, global governance and
28
legal theory, 27 and behavioral research. It thus comes as no surprise

22. See Gunther Teubner, Corporate Codes in the Varieties of Capitalism: How Their
Enforcement Depends upon the Difference Between ProductionRegimes, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 81 (2017) (describing methods of domestic enforcement and how varieties of
capitalism influence the formulation and enforcement of corporate codes).
23. See Jan M. Smits, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Under Private
Law: On the Disciplining Power of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 99
(2017) (analyzing the extent to which corporate social responsibility codes can be enforced
onto private parties).
24. See Beckers, supra note 16 (describing global self-regulation in a normative sense
through corporate social responsibility codes).
25. See Teubner, supra note 22.
26. See Thielborger & Ackermann, supra note 16 (analyzing the confluence of human
rights law and corporate social responsibility).
27. See Larry CatA Backer, A Lex Mercatoria for CorporateSocial Responsibility Codes
Without the State? A Critique of Legalization Within the State Under the Premises of
Globalization, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 115 (2017) (describing a series of embedded
behavioral controls attached to and in the realm of the state).
28. See Mark T. Kawakami, Pitfalls of Over-Legalization: When the Law Crowds Out
and Spills Over, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 147 (2017) (analyzing from a behavioral

6
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that each author develops their own descriptions and normative
arguments. The fact that the authors reveal their different theoretical
grounds is relevant as it can cause meta-reflections about the
persuasiveness of the argument that is related to a discussion of the
right approach. The perspectives that the respective authors offer and
the conclusions that they arrive at will be discussed more in detail
below with a view to what combined insights they can provide and what
meta-reflections they require.
A. The Possibility of Using PrivateLaw for the Enforcement of CSR
Codes
The debate over whether the concepts and doctrines in domestic
private law are capable, in the first place, of providing for the
enforcement is introduced by Anna Beckers. Beckers identifies two main
aspects in which substantive private law struggles with the enforcement
of corporate social responsibility codes: specifically, their character as
unilateral declarations and as a new form of public interest-oriented
private regulation does not find equivalents in established private law
doctrines and concepts. However, relying on an understanding of the
law as a cognitively open system capable of reacting to new social
phenomena, she makes the case that recent legal developments,
initiated through case laws and statutory reforms, have opened up
possibilities that can be successively broadened in order to allow
enforcement. Hence, corporate social responsibility codes can
substantively be linked and integrated into private law. This fits with
Pierre Thielborger and Tobias Ackermann, who also provide in their
contribution an indication for the feasibility of domestic enforcement.
They mention recent national tort law cases, such as the
aforementioned Shell cases in the Netherlands, which may provide
sufficient ground to assume that national courts are beginning to
embrace global forms of regulation in order to safeguard the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights. In Beckers's contribution,
however, a more skeptical position appears as to the possibility of
aligning private international law through linking the global and the
domestic sphere. With a view to recent research on private international
law and global governance, 29 she emphasizes that quite fundamental
standpoint how threats of legal sanctions, or other external incentives, can be detrimental
to companies striving to be socially responsible).
29. See Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law Beyond the Schism, 2
TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 347, 354-55 (2011); Horatia Muir Watt, Conflicts of Laws
Unbounded: The Case for a Legal-PluralistRevival, 7 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY
(2016), forthcoming (online pre-print).
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changes in the relation between private autonomy and mandatory rules
in this area of law would have to be made.
Adding a doctrinal perspective to the collection, Jan Smits
differentiates further as to the possibility of using private law concepts
for the enforcement. He argues that the enforcement requires taking
into consideration three aspects: the exact type of claim that is made,
the societal perceptions about whether the enforcement of corporate
social responsibility codes should be binding, and the normative
complexity of the legal system itself. On that basis, Smits delineates
three different constellations (or types of claims) and argues that only
one of them provides a good case for enforcement under private law. To
him, domestic enforcement is possible when corporate social
responsibility codes are incorporated into bilateral contracts whereas it
is not feasible when affected third parties, such as workers, seek to
enforce them as unilateral promises. Smits identifies, as a disputed
case, the enforcement by socially responsible consumers on the ground
that the societal expectations toward the binding character of corporate
social responsibility codes have not materialized to an extent that
private law doctrine would support this through legal enforcement.
Read together, Beckers and Smits disagree on an important point
that leads to one subsequent question that is relevant for the
enforcement of global private regulation: If global corporate CSR selfregulation differs significantly from its domestic counterpart, how much
can the system of private law in fact adapt its internal doctrinal
complexity to the profound transformations brought about by economic
globalization without ceasing to exist as a complex system and giving up
its integrity? What Smits seems to be concerned about is that an
instrumentalization of the law to deal with global private regulation in
its form as unilateral corporate declarations would, in many cases,
undermine the very foundation of the legal system itself; an inevitable
ignorance toward such global phenomena might thus contribute to what
Niklas Luhmann has identified as the declining relevance of the legal
system under globalization.3 0 Beckers, in contrast, sees the stronger
readiness of the law to react to new social phenomena as crucial for the
private law system to survive and emphasizes that past experience has
rather shown the capability of the law to maintain internal complexity
even under significant societal transformations that it provided the

30. NiKLAs LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 490 (Fatima Kastner et al. eds., Klaus
A. Ziegart trans., 2004) ("[Ijt may well be that the current prominence of the legal system
and the dependence of society itself and of most of its functional systems on a functioning
legal coding are nothing but a European anomaly, which might well level off with the
evolution of a global society.").
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legal structures for. 31 As socio-legal scholars have argued, legal
reasoning is often related to the social context; it reflects changes in the
social reality. 32 Given these two very different perspectives, there
remains an open question for the future discussion: How much
transformation can private law bear in the light of globalization and its
very distinct ordering structures?
In approaching the enforcement of corporate social responsibility
codes from a comparative perspective, Gunther Teubner further
differentiates as to the ability of private law to provide for the
enforcement. His contribution is embedded within the seminal
conceptual political economy framework of the varieties of capitalism
developed by Hall and Soskice, 33 which he argues is still valid under the
premises of globalization. He suggests that instead of leading to a
convergence of national production regimes that have originally led to
the different national variants of economic capitalism, globalization has
rather reinforced their differences. 34 To that end, he provides a
perspective that considers enforcement within some national political
economies more likely than in others. To him, the enforcement of
corporate social responsibility codes in liberal market economies, such
as the United States, remains difficult to be realized, whereas
coordinated market economies, such as Germany, are more prone to
facilitating enforcement. One important reason for this stronger
tendency toward enforcement on the European continent is found in the
strong institutionalization of economic democracy and the active role of
courts and their tendency to step in and develop this mode of selfregulation further through enforcement. To that end, corporate social
responsibility codes are controlled and regulated insofar as they impose
internal obligations upon employees, and they are transformed into
binding obligations toward the external public as further evidence for
the mandatory social role that companies already have in this variant of
capitalism. In contrast, in liberal market economies, corporate social
responsibility codes remain a form of market self-regulation that private
law may facilitate, but may not regulate or enforce.
Interestingly, if one takes a bird's-eye perspective on the
contributions in this issue and the way in which they interact, one
might even go as far as to identify some evidence in support of

31. See Beckers, supranote 16.
32. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Taking Law and Society Seriously, 74 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 529, 538 (1999) ("The content or substance of legal argument is also socially
determined-and politically meaningful.").
33. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
34. See Teubner, supra note 22 at 83.
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Teubner's argument within the issue itself. The two most skeptical
contributors on the legalization of corporate social responsibility codes
by Larry CatA Backer and Mark Kawakami implicitly understand the
nature of domestic enforcement of CSR codes in line with how they
would be treated from the perspective of liberal market economies.
Domestic enforcement is understood as a form of governmental
intervention or politically activist courts that destroy the productive
35
In contrast, the two
potential of self-regulatory market processes.
contributors most favorable toward enforcement, Beckers and Teubner,
governmental
as
not
emphatically,
enforcement
understand
a form of
as
but
intervention into societal or market processes,
and
politics,
law,
of
sphere
negotiated public responsibility between the
courts
that
standards
the
economic actors, by which private actors set
further develop. 36 Hence, some disagreement about the possibility, and
the desirability, lies ultimately, again at a meta-level, in the different
understandings of where the political element in an enforcement
process is to be located: In the domestic state, should it be located in its
governments and politicized courts in providing for the enforcement, or
in the private sphere that set the standards for a politicized economic
system, an economic democracy, which courts link to a legal, but not
political process? Certainly, this contrast between different
contributions provides more anecdotal rather than scientifically sound
evidence for the national differences in the conception of enforcement.
And yet, it might nonetheless provide some indication for the need to
take account of how arguments about the domestic regulation of globally
operating companies and their self-regulation could be strongly
influenced by the national institutional framework on the regulation of
companes.
The final contribution in this section, written by Jan Eijsbouts,
places the emphasis on a different area of the law, specifically corporate
and securities laws, to argue that various measures in this area are
incentivizing the creation and the enforcement of corporate social
35. See Backer, supra note 27, at 131, who defines the project of domestic enforcement
as a project to embed corporate codes within the current structures of the domestic legal
orders of states, which he sees as threatening both the state and its law, and the distinctly
different forms of autonomous social ordering. See Kawakami, supra note 28, who equally
defines legalization as a transformation of social norms into legal norms. Legal norms,
according to Kawakami, comprise of governmental regulation and private law
enforcement backed up by government-recognized sanctions. Id.
36. Teubner conceptualizes enforcement as the "internal politicization of the European
economic culture," in which enforced corporate codes also "produce new impulses for
economic democracy." Teubner, supra note 22, at 95. Beckers discusses enforcement as a
way "to lend legitimacy to these new forms of global norm-production." Beckers, supra
note 16, at 28.
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responsibility codes.37 His analysis of these areas of the law and related
policies, including, but not limited to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance
and the European Commission's strategy on corporate social
responsibility, reveals that the enforcement in these areas is
transforming corporate social responsibility from a purely voluntary
concept to almost a mandatory framework for businesses. 38 Eijsbouts
also argues that in this context, the enforcement of corporate codes is
being driven, not through traditional regulatory intervention, but
through what Eijsbouts classifies as meta-regulation.3 9 By this, he
means that companies are now required to develop tailor-made codes of
conduct and implement strict monitoring programs and publicly report
on them. Eijsbouts's contribution also offers practical suggestions for
companies on what elements such an internal enforcement mechanism
should have. 40
What can be gained from combining these different perspectives as
to the possibilities within private law to provide for the domestic
enforcement of corporate social responsibility codes? Read together, the
contributions can be considered to reveal four main factors that
influence the capability of private law to provide for the enforcement
that could set the basis for further debate: First, the differences within
private law itself, in particular between (external) contract law and
(internal) corporate law, as to their readiness to provide for the
enforcement; second, the internal complexity of private law doctrine and
whether and how innovative doctrine is in relation to the novel
configurations wrought by private actors under globalization; third, the
relevance of the domestic socioeconomic and political contexts that
influence the perceptions about the possibilities of private law in
providing for the enforcement against economic actors; and, fourth, the
inevitable intrinsic linking of private law with private international law
as an important additional obstacle in any attempt to domesticate
global regulatory processes.
B. The Desirabilityof Using PrivateLaw for the Enforcement
This controversy over the (im)possibility of domestic private law to
provide for the enforcement is, however, predicated on deeper, much
37. See Jan Eijsbouts, Corporate Codes as Private Co-Regulatory Instruments in
Corporate Governance and Responsibility and Their Enforcement, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 181 (2017).
38. Id.
39. Id at 182.
40. Id at 198.
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more normative questions: Should the project of domestic enforcement
for corporate social responsibility codes be furthered? Should private
law be transformed to make it fit for the new reality of global private
regulation? These normative questions remain heavily disputed, even
among the authors contributing to this issue. In general, three of this
contribution's authors focus specifically on the question of whether
enforcement is normatively desirable.
Backer positions himself in his contribution as a strong critic who
4
looks "on this quite worthy and necessary project with dread." 1 His
concern is informed by the fact that corporate codes have evolved in an
era of globalization, in which the law is freed from the state. Informed
by global law and governance theory, he argues that the project of
domesticating corporate codes exactly undermines the autonomy of this
liberalized sphere consisting of social and economic processes including
42
an autonomous, depoliticized legal system and the state alike.
Corporate codes, if legalized within the state, cease to serve as
institutions for global, social, or economic processes. As he puts it
himself: "The victory for law that is finely crafted through the
legalization project may well undermine the foundation of the very
system in whose service legalization is undertaken." 43 At the same time,
the legalization seems to overpoliticize the state and its legal system by
stretching the concept of law unjustly to cover private ordering by
companies and by destabilizing the state system through an
understanding of corporations as political sovereigns. In that respect,
Backer's contribution places the emphasis on the difference between
legalization of private ordering in domestic societies and legalization
under the premises of globalization. He makes a strong plea for keeping
the domestic state and private regulation apart under the conditions of
globalization and for refraining from pursuing a project that identifies
the nucleus of global ordering processes in a centralized state, as it was
perceived in the time prior to globalization.
Similar to Backer, Kawakami is equally skeptical about the legal
enforcement of otherwise voluntary corporate social responsibility codes.
Unlike Backer, however, Kawakami relies on various behavioral studies
as a basis for his argument and suggests that the legal enforcement of
corporate codes could render undesirable outcomes given the various
unintended repercussions that could arise from an enforcement of such
kind, including but not limited to spillover effects and the crowding out
of intrinsic motivations. 44 In short, Kawakami envisions a scenario that
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Backer, supra note 27, at 121.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 122.
See Kawakami, supra note 28, at 160.
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if voluntary corporate social responsibility codes become legally
enforceable, companies may be less inclined to adopt these codes
altogether or would redraft them in a manner so as to minimize their
liability. So while Kawakami does not contest that legally enforcing
corporate codes could indeed be feasible, he nevertheless argues that
given the possible negative externalities, doing so would be undesirable.
Whereas Backer bases his critique on the conceptual differences
between the domestic and the global context in linking social ordering to
the state, Kawakami criticizes the project of legalization for its possible
detrimental effects on the corporate sphere and its otherwise productive
social ordering processes in general.
Finally, Thielb6rger and Ackermann start with the presumption
that the normative demand within human rights law and theory is that
an effective enforcement of human rights against violating global
corporations is required, which can include the enforcement of private
regulatory initiatives. 45 They, in contrast to Backer and Kawakami,
point out that a process of enforcement in general is desirable from a
human rights law perspective, but that the current international court
system may not provide for the enforcement on a global level. They
focus specifically on the recent initiatives at the level of the United
Nations, such as the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, the critique that they receive, and the current debate on
developing a binding and enforceable treaty on business and human
rights. Criticizing the treaty option as unfeasible and unlikely to be
enforced, they make a plea for a strong implementation of the U.N.
Guiding Principles, which ultimately requires the enforcement by
domestic courts of corporate social responsibility codes. Eijsbouts's
contribution also lends support for this position, classifying the U.N.
Guiding Principles as the most current, comprehensive codification of
the social license to operate.
Apart from these three contributions, the question about the
normative desirability appears also in other contributions in this
collection. In particular, Beckers makes the strong case in favor of
domestic enforcement, which she bases on the need for the law to be
responsive to new social phenomena and to handle the potentials and
risks that they pose. Eijsbouts supports this position by arguing that
strict enforcement of corporate codes follows the normative need of
companies to maintain their social license to operate. Again, Jan Smits
contrasts this position by arguing that exactly such a societal perception
about the binding nature of unilateral CSR codes that could normatively
inform private law cannot yet be identified. In this disagreement, one

45. See Thielborger and Ackermann, supra note 16, at 4.
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can again identify a broader issue that is directed toward the convincing
normative assessment about when society is actually in need of the law.
It might be the contribution by Teubner that seems to offer here a
debatable middle ground by viewing domestic enforcement as a valuable
instance to provide for stabilization of the internally-politicized global
economy that "is accompanied and supported by societal actors who play
an increasing role in the formulation and implementation of corporate
codes". And this means that "enforcement .. . is not only performed by
national courts, rather results from a combination of public interest
litigation, self-regulation of the enterprises and external monitoring by
civil society actors." 46
Viewed as a whole, all of these arguments can be read as answers or
at least partial explanations to the question about the normative
desirability of domestically enforcing corporate social responsibility
codes, which also touch upon meta-questions about the function of
domestic law under globalization. In particular, the normative question
is related to whether and to what extent domestic law should be an
instrument that is used in the further development of global regulatory
processes. Moreover, the contributions can also be read as providing
further thought about whether functionally differentiated global
regulation and territorially differentiated domestic laws should
ultimately meet or remain autonomous. Regulate global, enforce local?
Or enforce global what has been regulated globally and enforce local
what has been regulated domestically? The articles in this Issue will not
provide an ultimate answer to this question, but if it can provide a
fruitful basis to begin discussing these questions and offer normative
criteria to start such a debate, much has been gained already.

46. Teubner, supra note 22 at 95.

